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or not, based on the average cost of supplying all independents; likewise,
fixed allowances were allotted to all chains, warranted or not. Thus an in-
dependent which conceivably could be a larger operation than an individual
store of a chain is a priori discriminated against. Therefore, no matter how
voluminous the cost study is in attempting to justify the price differences,
it will be to no avail since the defense is defective conceptually.
Cost justification, by its nature, is a difficult defense. As Mr. Justice
Frankfurter said in Automatic Canteen v. FTC, "Cost Justification, being
what it is, too often no one can ascertain whether a price is cost justified."' 3
The statement appears amply justified by the realistic problems of cost
accounting. Functional costs, for example, may be allocated to customer
groups if three principles are followed: (1) The discount class must not be
too large; (2) The • boundaries between the customer classes must be
reasonably placed, i.e., where costs change most conspicuously; (3) No class
should receive a discount which is excessive as compared with another class."
These costs, however, which are to be compared for defense purposes are
not always apparent. They should take into account every allowance, rebate,
discount, etc., or in sum, all financial considerations which pass from seller
to buyer. The accounting problems, therefore, are visibly superimposed on
the basic legal problems underlying the cost justification proviso.
The impact of the Borden decision is that no cost analysis constructed'
on the basis of a customer classification by ownership and providing average
costs for the resulting groups can be used to justify discriminations among
customers regardless of the actual costs of doing business with each. No
matter how detailed the accounting justification, the defense will fail
because of the incipient defect.
J. NORMAN BAKER
Workmen's Compensation—Second Injury Fund—Accessibility Re-
quirements When Second Injury Follows Latent Disability.—Pittson
Stevedoring Corp. v. Hughes.'—The claimant, while employed as a long-
shoreman by Nessa Corp., sustained an injury to his back. A compensation
order found him to be totally disabled from January 30 until February 26,
1952 and partially disabled from February 27, 1952 to June 14, 1953. On
June 13, 1953 the claimant, while working as a longshoreman for the Pittson
Company, sustained a second injury to his back and in a subsequent compen-
sation order was found to be totally disabled from June 15, 1953 to Novem-
ber 25, 1954 and partially disabled from November 26, 1954 to April 4, 1957.
Each of the insurance carriers, on behalf of its insured employer, continued to
make bi-weekly payments pursuant to the compensation award until each had
paid to the claimant the sum of $10,000, the statutory limit at the time of the
accident for permanent partial disability. The claimant then made applica-
la 346 U.S. 61, 79 (1953).
14 See Freer, Accounting Problems Under the Robinson-Patman Act, 65 j.
Accountancy 480 (1938).
1 198 F. Supp. 657 (E.D.N.Y. 1961).
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tion for a reconsideration of his case claiming that he was permanently and
totally disabled due to a change in his physical condition which occurred since
the hearing of April 4, 1957. The Deputy Commissioner found that "as a
result of the combined effects of" the two injuries the claimant was perma-
nently and totally disabled from engaging in gainful employment. He held
the two employers or insurance carriers jointly liable for permanent total
disability and directed each to pay the claimant fifty per cent of the maximum
weekly compensation from that date, and during the continuance of the
claimant's total disability. The employers contended that by. reason of the
fact that claimant's total disability is the combined result of both accidents,
each of which resulted in only partial disability, the permanent total disability
payments should be paid out of the Second Injury Fund pursuant to the provi-
sions of the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act.2
HELD: The Deputy Commissioner erred when he directed that both em-
ployers were jointly liable for permanent total disability. Awards should be
made from the Second Injury Fund where an injury aggravates disability
caused by a prior injury of any kind.
Second Injury Fund provisions have found their way into the workmen's
compensation schemes of some forty-four states. 3 Their primary purpose is
to facilitate the employment of the physically handicapped by means of
economic incentives offered to the employer.4 Second Injury Fund laws
2
 44 Stat. 1424 (1927), 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-45, 947-50 (1958).
3
 Ala. Code tit. 26, § 288(1) (1958) ; Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 23-1065(3) (1956) ;
Ark. Stat. § 81-1313f (1947); Cal. Lab. Code Ann. § 4755 (1955); Colo. Rev. Stat.
Ann. § 81-12-7 (1953) ; Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 31-216 (1958) ; Del. Code Ann. tit. 19,
§ 2327 (1953) ; Fla. Stat. Ann. § 440,15(5) (d) (1959) ; Hawaii Rev, Laws § 97-27 (Supp.
1957); Idaho Code Ann. § 72-314 (1949); III. Ann. Stat. ch. 48, § 138,8 (Supp. 1961) ;
Ind. Stat. Ann. § 40-1308 (Supp. 1962) ; Iowa Code Ann. § 85.64 (Supp. 1961); Kan.
Gen. Stat, Ann. § 44-568 (1949); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 342.122(7) (Supp. 1962); Mc.
Rev. Stat. Ann. ch. 31, § 14 (1954); Md. Ann. Code art. 101,66 (1957); Mass. Ann.
Laws ch. 152, §§ 37, 37A, 65 (1957); Mich. Stat. Ann. § 17.158(1) (Supp. 1961) ; Minn.
Stat. Ann. §• 176.13 (Supp. 1961); Miss. Code Ann. § 6998-37 (Supp. 1960) ; Mo. Ann.
Stat. § 287.220 (Supp. 1961); Mont. Rev. Codes Ann. § 92-709A (Supp. 1961); Neb.
Rev. Stat. § 48-128 (1960); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. ch. 281, § 48 (1955); N.J. Stat. Ann.
§§ 34:15-94 to -95 (1959) ; N.M. Stat. Ann. § 59-10-129 (Supp. 1961); N.Y. Work-
men's Comp. Laws § 15.8h (1960); N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 97-35 to -40.1 (1958); N.D.
Cent. Code § 65-04-18 (1960); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 4123.34.3 (Supp. 1961) ; Okla.
Stat. Ann. tit. 85 §§ 171-73 (Supp. 1961); Ore. Rev. Stat. §§ 656.224 to A60 (1955);
Pa. Stat. Ann. tit, 77, § 516 (Supp. 1961) ; R.I. Gen. Laws Ann. § 28-37-1-4 (1956) ;
S.C. Code § 72-189 (1952); S.D. Code § 64.0112 (Supp. 1960); Tenn. Code Ann. §
50-1027 (Supp. 1962) ; Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 8306, § 12c (1956); Utah Code Ann.
§ 35-1-68 (Supp. 1961); Wash. Rev. Code §§ 51.16.120 to .44.040 (Supp. 1961) ; W. Va.
Code Ann. § 2523 (1961); Wis. Stat. § 102.59 (1957); Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-149-155
(1957).
4 The Supreme Court in Lawson v. Suwanne S.S. Co., 336 U.S. 198, 202 (1949),
indicated this to be the legislative intent behind the Second Injury Fund provisions of
the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act:
We must look to the explanation of congressional intent behind the subsection.
A witness at a hearing on the measure outlined his reasons for favoring the pro-
vision in the following manner: 'The second injury proposition is as much to
the advantage of the employer and his interests as it is for the benefit of the
employee. It protects that employer who has hired, say, a one-eyed worker
who goes and loses his other eye and becomes a total disability. The employer
without this sort of thing would have to pay total permanent disability corn-
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typically provide that prospective employers shall be liable only for the dis-
ability caused by an injury which is incurred in their employment without
taking into consideration pre-existing physical impairments. The balance of
any compensation which may be due as a result of the combination of both
disabilities is payable out of the Second Injury Fund to which industry, as
a whole, contributes directly or indirectly. More simply, a man with no hands
has suffered greater total damage than the mere loss of his second hand, but
where Second Injury Fund provisions exist, the second employer merely pays
for the loss of one hand and the difference between the loss of that hand and
total disability is absorbed by the fund.
The case at bar is interesting because it places the federal Second
Injury Fund provision in a rather dubious position with respect to access-
ability requirements. The court in the instant case held that in order to shift
the burden of total disability payments to the fund the second employer need
only allege that the second injury aggravated a disability caused by a prior
injury of any kind.' Under this holding, the employer is not required to
pensation. Then, on the other hand, this also protects the worker with one eye
from being denied employment on account of his being an extra risk. Now, by
simply taking this up in this way it is possible to protect both the employer and
to protect the one-eyed employee also.' Hearings before Committee on the Judi-
ciary, House of Representatives on S. 3170, 69th Cong., 1st Sess., 208 (1926).
To the same effect see New York Workmen's Comp. Law, § 15(8) (a) (1960) (Declara-
tion of policy and legislative intent).
5
 The ramifications of this position are interesting. As pointed out in Subsequent
Injuries Fund v. Industrial Acc. Cornm'n, of Cal., 135 Cal. App. 2d 544, 553, 288 P.2d
31, 36 (1955) in the "Subsequent Injuries Fund Report of the Sub-committee of the As-
sembly Interim Committee on Finance and Insurance" of the California Legislature (vol.
15, no. 7, 1953-55, Assembly Interim Committee Report) attention is called to the wide
variety of pathologies (most of them asymptomatic, i.e., unmanifested) which have been
urged as a basis for commission awards against the Subsequent Injuries Fund. Among
those mentioned were: syphilis, hysteria and other forms of mental derangement, hairlip,
speech impediments, nervousness, decreased mental capacity, hemorrhoids, false teeth,
flat feet, knock knees and schizophrenia of the paranoid type. Claims such as these
prompted the California Legislature to amend its statute in 1955 so that only certain
enumerated types of injuries can now serve as the basis of a claim against the Subsequent
Injury Fund. (Cal. Lab. Code, § 4751(a)-(b)). See Ferguson v. Industrial Ace. Bd.
50 Cal. 2d 469, 326 P.2d 145 (1958).
The California experience is precluded to some extent in the administration of the
Second Injury Fund provision of the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensa-
tion Act by the Bureau regulation which states that, , "Awards from the special fund will
not be made in cases where an injury increases or aggravates disability due to disease,
congenital defects or causes other than a prior injury." Bureau of Employee's Compensa-
tion, Department of Labor, 20 C.F.R. 31.19 (1961).
This regulation is an inadequate safeguard for two reasons. First, the adequacy of.
the regulation depends to a great extent, on the unfortunate term "prior injury." In
Lawson v. Suwanne, supra note 4, at 204, the Supreme Court held that "prior injury"
need not be an industrial injury to come within the meaning of the instant statute. Also,
"prior injuries" may give rise to latent disabilities, such as the back injury in the case
at bar, which constitute no obstacle to general employment and, absent the "employer
knowledge" requirement, were not intended to be compensable under the Second Injury
Fund provision.
Second, the regulation is unduly restrictive in the sense that it fails to recognize that
a latent disability or disease can constitute an obstacle to employment, a "handicap"
within the Lawson 75. Suwanne meaning of the term. Fabing and Barrow, Encouragement
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allege that he knew he had a handicapped worker in his employ nor is any
evidence required that the employee's handicap constituted an obstacle to
employment.
Since the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act was
taken almost in toto from the New York Workmen's Compensation Law as
it existed in 1927, decisions interpreting the New York act should, at least,
be persuasive in the construction of the federal statute!' Since the primary
objective of the New York Second Injury Fund is to encourage the employ-
ment of the handicapped, the New York courts have considered it essential
that the employer allege that he had knowledge of the handicapped condi-
tion, and thereby gain an appreciation of the "risk" he was taking, before he
will be entitled to the "reward" of the Second Injury Fund.' The court, in
the leading case of Zyla v. Julliard,8 reasoned:
The statute does not in express terms require that the parties know
of the existence of the permanent physical impairment. But knowl-
edge on the part of the employer . . . is required by the implication
of the statutory formula.
That knowledge by the employer of the impairment, arising
either from its obvious nature or from actual knowledge of a latent
impairment, is essential, is suggested by the fact the Legislature
would have no need to encourage the employment of persons whose
impairments are so obscure as not to be apparent, because they
would meet no special barriers to general employment„ „ The dis-
abilities that come within the definition are not merely those that
are permanent, but those that also are or may he likely to hinder
employment or be an obstacle to employment.
This necessarily requires an informed decision one way or the
other by a present or prospective employer. The whole purpose of
the statute is to encourage the employment of persons known to be
physically handicapped.
of Employment of the Handicapped-Extension of Second Injury Fund Principles to
Persons Having Latent Impairments, 8 Vaud. L. Rev, 575 (1955).
A skillfully drawn Second Injury Fund provision can encourage the employment of
all the handicapped and still retain the essential safeguards which the "employer knowl-
edge requirement" provides. The Ohio provision is a good illustration of such a statute.
This statute requires the employer to notify the industrial commission prior to the
occurrence of the second injury that it has in its employ a handicapped employee. The
statute then goes on to specify some twenty-two disabilities which constitute a "handicap"
within the meaning of the statute. Among these are included: (I) Epilepsy, (2) Diabetes;
(7) Residual disability from poliomylitis; (12) Tuberculosis; (14) Psychoneurotic dis-
ability following treatment in a recognized medical or mental institutition, (15) Hemo-
philia; (16) Chronic osteomylitis; (18) Hyperinsulinism, (20) Arterio-sclerosis; (21)
Thrombo-phlebitis. Ohio Rev. Code Ann., § 4123.34.3 (A)-(C) (Supp. 1961).
Iacone v. Cardillo, 208 F.2d 696 (2d Cir. 1953); see Lawson v. Suwanne S.S. Co.,
supra note 3, at 205.
7 Tucci v. J. F. Carey & Co., 15 App. Div. 2d 622, 222 N.Y.S.2d 358 (1961); Luero
v. Tronolone, 1 App. Div. 2d 713, 146 N.Y.S.2d 881 (1955); Dugan v. Muller Dairies
Inc., 282 App. Div. 590, 125 N.Y.S.2d 530 (1953); Zyla v. Julliard & Co., 277 App. Div.
604, 102 N.Y.S.2d 255 (1951).
8 277 App. Div. at 605, 102 N.Y.S.2d at 257 (1951).
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In the instant case there was no evidence that the employer knew that
the claimant had a pre-existing disability. We might safely assume, however,
that due to the nature of the injury and the rather informal hiring practices
in the stevedoring trade that the second employer would have had a very
heavy burden of proving knowledge of pre-existing disability. The govern-
ment argued the instant case on the theory that the statute was intended to
compensate for "scheduled" injuries only." The argument is logical since the
original New York statute specified the types of injuries compensable by the
Second Injury Fund," and at present, some twenty-six states make similar
specifications." The court held, however, that since the federal statute makes
no such specification it should be applied literally and the "reward" of the
Second Injury Fund should be granted in any case where two partial dis-
abilities add up to permanent total disability. The knowledge issue was not
passed upon.
But even if we ignore the genetics of the federal statute, the absence of
federal case law or a federal statutory requirement of "knowledge of previous
disability" seems anomalous. The clear purpose of the Second Injury Fund
is to encourage the employment of the handicapped. The second employer
can hardly allege that he was encouraged to take the "risk" of hiring a
handicapped person if he was ignorant of the risk, i.e., ignorant of the fact
that he was, in fact, hiring a handicapped person." Absent federal case Iaw
or a statutory requirement of "knowledge" the Second Injury Fund will in-
stead reward the employer who is merely resourceful enough to make a sub-
sequent search through the disabled employee's history for a pathological
connection between a past injury and the present total disability,"
9 Supra note I, at 659.
10
 N.Y. Workmen's Comp. Law, 15(8) (1927).
It See, in supra note 3, Alabama, Arizona, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Idaho,
Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Mississippi,
Montana, New Hampshire, North Carolina, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Dakota,
Tennessee, Vermont and Wyoming.
Additional states Have other specific statutory limitations on the type of prior dis-
ability prerequisite to bringing the second injury within the operation of the fund. Such
limitations evidence an attempt to place some limit on the types of compensable dis-
abilities in order to further the purpose of the statute. Delaware (permanent injuries
only), Kentucky (all injuries except those resulting from disease), Nebraska (all injuries
except those resulting from disease), North Dakota (personal injuries and/or occupational
diseases), Oklahoma (injuries apparent to laymen or adjudged by Industrial Commis-
sion), Texas (injuries to include certain occupational diseases), and Washington (all
disabilities resulting from injuries).
12 There has been some opposition to the statutory construction which implies the
knowledge requirement.
"Such a construction penalized the employer who attempted to discover any impair-
ment but failed to do so because the impairment was not readily discoverable and the
employee, if he knew of the impairment, failed to disclose." Fabing and Barrow, En-
couragement of Employment of the Handicapped-Extension of Second Injury Fund
Principles to Persons Having Latent Impairments, 8 Vand. L. Rev. 575, 587 (1955).
When we consider that the Second Injury Fund was set up to reward an employer
who hired a handicapped person it is difficult to see how an employer, ignorant of the
fact that he has employed a handicapped person, is "penalized" when he is denied access
to the fund. In actuality he has merely failed to qualify for the "reward."
19 One writer, while treating the "knowledge" requirement in the Mississippi
apportionment statute, stated the case quite succinctly: "In other words the legislature
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Federal case law may yet follow the New York example and imply this
"employer knowledge" requirement into the federal statutory formula.''
However, an explicit statutory requirement that the employer prove that he
at least understood that he had hired a handicapped person before permitting
him to shift the burden of total disability payments to the fund would seem
to be a preferable alternative. 15
H. WAYNE JUDGE
Contributor
desired to give the employers a break, but only if he gave the handicapped worker a
break—with full knowledge that he was a handicapped worker. It was not the intention
of this provision to open the gates for a belated sweeping inquiry into the medical history
of an employee whenever he or she made a claim for compensation benefits." Shanahan,
Amendments to the Workmen's Compensation Act 1956-1958, 30 Miss. L.J. 105, 169
(1959).
14
 Florida has implied the "employer knowledge" requirement into its statute by
case law. Wall v. Speh, 133 So. 2d 304 (Sup. Ct., Fla. 1961). But see Ferguson v. Industrial
Ace. Bd., .50 Cal. 2d 469, 326 P.2d 145 (1958).
Some federal courts have threatened to take this course. See the dissent in National
Homeopathic Hosp. Ass'n v. Britton, 147 F.2d 561, 566 (D.C. Cir. 1945).
In Scott v. Alaska Industrial Bd., 91 F. Supp. 201 (D.C. Alaska 1950) the court
stated at 203:
. . . the term "prior disability," as used in second injury provisions, is not to be
construed as including prior unmanifested disability. Nor is this view inconsistent
with the social aim of such statutory provisions to encourage the hiring of the
partially disabled, for obviously where the prior condition does not manifest it-
self, no ground for discrimination in hiring would exist.
But see Vanderver v. Voris, 147 F. Supp. 447 (S.D. Tex. 1956).
1 5
 New Mexico's recently enacted statute is a good illustration of such an approach:
After January 1, 1962, the Subsequent Injury Act shall be applicable only in
those cases where there has been filed with the superintendent of insurance prior
to the injury or occurrence causing the subsequent disability a certificate of exist-
ing physical impairment. . . (Emphasis added.)
The statute goes on to provide that the certificate does not have to be filed with the
superintendent if the employer retains, in his own files, a certified medical history,
signed by him, the employee and a doctor and executed prior to the second injury.
N.M. Stat. Ann. 59-10-133 (Supp. 1961). This second alternative seems preferable
because it will minimize the administration costs of the provision.
Minnesota has a similar statute, Minn. Stat. Ann. g 176.13 (Supp. 1961).
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